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E9h1del1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 12 CR 802 (KBF) V. 5 DAVID DELVA, 6 Defendant. Jury Trial -----x 7 8 New York, N.Y. September 17, 2014 9 9:18 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. KATHERINE B. FORREST, 12 District Judge 13 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 16 JUSTINA GERACI 17 RYAN POSCABLO Assistant United States Attorney 18 JEFFREY PITTELL 19 Attorney for Defendant Delva 20 21 ALSO PRESENT: JOHN REYNOLDS, Special Agent FBI ANNIE CHEN, Paralegal Specialist, U.S. Attorney's Office 22 23 24 25

1 (Trial resumed)

(Case called)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your name for the record.

MR. POSCABLO: Good morning, your Honor. Ryan Poscablo, Justina Geraci, Annie Chen, and John Reynolds.

THE COURT: Good morning, all of you.

MR. PITTELL: Good morning, your Honor. Jeffrey Pittell for Mr. Delva, who's present.

THE COURT: Good morning to each of you.

We're here at the moment because an issue developed overnight relating to juror no. 7. It appears that the government has run a background check and determined that there's a possibility that juror no. 7 is the same individual as a Barbara Kearse who has been convicted of a felony relating to drug possession and also been arrested on a number of occasions for drug sales *inter alia*.

The court itself pulled the juror questionnaire that's filled out downstairs, and I've got copies for you folks of the relevant pages, and I'll have Joe hand you each one. It does appear that the date of birth and the address match that which is set forth in the police reports and the information attached by the government to their submission. It does indicate on the juror form that this juror indicated that she, under questions 5 and 6, had not been convicted of a felony. She

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checked no. She in fact, if it's the same person, has been convicted of a felony. We'll determine, obviously, whether we've got the same person or not. Question 7 says: "Were your civil rights restored?" And that question is answered yes. Now that can mean a variety of things. Obviously we all think of it as the formal process for the restoration of civil rights, which, under New York law, requires an application for the restoration of rights and the issuance of a certificate that would then provide the restoration of rights, and it's possible that she applied for and received that. It's also obtainable through a pardon from the government. There may be other ways, but those are the ways which come to mind. Nevertheless, it does appear that questions 5 and 6 were answered inaccurately. It's possible there was some confusion as to whether or not, if there was a restoration of rights, that somehow eliminated the need to answer 5 and 6 with an answer that would be yes. So that's one issue is whether or not there has been an issue with respect to the form filled out under penalty of perjury downstairs. You'll note that at the bottom it has an "under penalty of perjury" line.

The other issue relates to the voir dire process which the court conducted where the court asked a broader question, which was not about a felony conviction but instead was about whether or not anyone in the group had a criminal arrest. The language is I think accurately cited and quoted in the

government's letter. And she did not indicate that she had.

In fact, there's an open warrant for her at this time as well as a number of arrests.

So that is the information which we have and so we don't know, I think, number one, while we seem to have an indication, it seems fairly clear to me, based upon the juror questionnaire filled out downstairs — it's crystal clear, frankly, but we don't know what her view will be as to whether or not she's the same person and whether she will concede that she's the same person.

She does not have an open warrant anymore. That has been cleared, but there are the arrests. I was just so informed of that by my deputy.

So I think the place to start would be to ask her to come in. I would propose to seat her in the first seat in the jury box and ask her a series of questions, including what is her date of birth, what's her address, etc. I'll do it very lightly because if we somehow made a mistake, it's important that she not feel that she's in the middle of an inquisition that's accusatory, and then I'll ask her if she's ever been arrested and ever been convicted of a felony, and then after that I'd ask her if her civil rights have been restored and through what kind of process, and depending upon the answers to the questions, I don't think it would take a very long period of time to figure out what her answers are going to be. We

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don't need to do a searching inquiry. And lastly, whether or not she has shared any information, if her answers are yes, that she has been arrested, with any of the other jurors. If her answers are as the court expects them to be -- I would hope that she would be truthful and honest with the court under direct questioning -- then she would be dismissed and that would be my intention. What I would do would say, at the end of that questioning, "Thank you very much, you can step outside, " confirm with you folks that you agree that dismissal is appropriate. If you don't agree that dismissal is appropriate, we'll deal with that. And then, if she is dismissed, then have her leave and have alternate no. 1 take her place. We would then discuss the process, but the process would be essentially calling all the 11 out, having alternate no. 1 take the place of 7, giving them the very light instruction, if you will, that, as I had said happens from time to time, alternates are called upon to serve, that has occurred here, the jury should not speculate as to why alternate 1 has been called upon, but they should now go and deliberate with alternate no. 1, who's now juror no. 7, on each and every count together. And so that would be the process. Because they do need to deliberate for each count. They can't just say, okay, we've already determined X, Y, or Z. They need to commence the deliberations again with them.

How does that process sound to you and do the

questions that I am proposing to ask juror no. 7 sound like the appropriate questions?

MR. POSCABLO: They do for the government, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Pittell?

MR. PITTELL: Judge, I object to the process and in no uncertain terms and as strong as possible.

THE COURT: Do you have any reason to believe that juror no. 7 is not the individual who has been convicted of a felony and served a year, which would disqualify her as a matter of law under 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(5), unless her civil rights have been restored?

MR. PITTELL: Yes, I do. The rap sheet that the government gave me indicates that a certificate of relief was granted to her on April 9, 2012.

THE COURT: Okay. So then --

MR. PITTELL: So her civil rights were restored, so I think under the statute, she's not disqualified under the statute.

THE COURT: Now do you agree with me that on her juror form, under questions 5 and 6, she did answer those questions inaccurately? Though as I previewed, it's possible that if her civil rights were in fact restored, that that could be a confusion, because she did answer then question 7 indicating she believed she'd gotten a certificate. However, those questions are inaccurate and nonetheless doesn't address the

second question, which was the voir dire that the court conducted asking the broader question of, "Has any juror been arrested?" And of course there are a number of arrests, so in that regard she was sworn to tell the truth. Frankly, if we'd known she had drug convictions for sales of cocaine, if that's in fact her and the issue here is in part those drug sales, we would have taken a hard look at whether or not there was a cause challenge, and I would suspect that had that been known, a peremptory would have been used, if there hadn't been an immediate cause dismissal.

MR. PITTELL: Well, responding to all that, regarding question 5, I don't think that there's a pending felony against her so I think question 5 is actually correct.

Question 7 is correct because she did get a certificate of relief.

Question 6 could be no because she thought that the issuance of the certificate of relief would have nullified that conviction.

Regarding her failure to answer the question to the court's questioning of the panel, sometimes jurors are intimidated, sometimes jurors are embarrassed, sometimes jurors don't want to speak up. I mean, look, I can speak from personal experience. I was in a jury pool and I was in the box, and the judge looked at the jury and said to all the jurors, "I'm the arbiter of the law and can you follow the

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instructions on the law as I give it to you?" And nobody raised their hand, and then I honestly raised my hand because I've read plenty of cases where, you know, civil or criminal verdicts were reversed because of instructional error. I've been personally involved in cases where that has occurred. I must say, it was a little embarrassing and I even felt a little intimidated on sort of, you know, rubbing it in the face of the judge, so to speak, even though I didn't know that judge, I knew nothing about him. And so it very well could be that her silence, especially because it's put to the panel as a whole, other people are sitting there, they're strangers, it's in the trappings of a courtroom setting, that her silence could have been just out of embarrassment. It's possible she was, on that question, not paying attention. I think the key inquiry here is whether or not she deliberately lied to get on this panel to somehow affect the trial, and I think that that is the I think that's the standard set forth in the two apparently controlling Supreme Court cases of McDonough and Phillips, and that seems to be the inquiry, actual bias by the juror.

THE COURT: Well, certainly actual bias by the juror is disqualifying. There's no doubt about that. It is also the case that juror misconduct can also be a grounds for disqualification with or without evidence of bias, if there is in fact true misconduct. I think that your point is that we

need to determine whether there's been juror misconduct and whether or not, in addition, there's bias. As you know, the court has previously expressed concerns regarding bias, given the body language of that particular juror prior to even commencing the deliberations, and so there was a question as to that issue. It just so happens that that same juror is the one that we're now talking about. So I hear your point. I think we need to do the inquiry. I'd like to do that now so that the rest of the jury panel isn't concerned. I should say they're being told we're having a conference, they should wait to begin deliberations until our conference has ended. They've been told nothing more.

MR. PITTELL: My concern about even having the inquiry process is that --

THE COURT: It would be error as a matter of law if I did not inquire into a possible assertion of jury misconduct.

That I think is clear from both Second Circuit and Supreme

Court precedent. I should not, however, and will not inquire into deliberations, thoughts about the evidence in any way, shape, or form. This is a very narrow issue.

MR. PITTELL: I understand, and I agree it's a narrow issue. My concern is, it's one of perception really from two perspectives. One, when the juror was doing the body language, I think we're all talking about when she was nodding in what we commonly interpret as a yes or an affirmative response, and it

occurred frequently during my summation.

THE COURT: And just to be clear about what the body language was, there were lots of times that jurors as human beings nod their heads in agreement with points even during instructions that the court gives because they sometimes feel that they want to interact in a human way. The concern of the court in terms of the body language, as I stated it yesterday, was it was an unusual amount. She was, frankly, on the edge of her seat during much of the body language exhibition, leaning forward in what I considered a jittery way, exhibiting the body language. Frankly, you know, I had sufficient concern about that to state it on the record. I normally don't state every movement of a juror sitting in the box on the record.

MR. PITTELL: I would agree. During my summation, I mean, I looked up and down the panel, back and forth, and I saw that she was nodding in what I would infer as agreement with some of the points that I was making, and that is unusual. I think any lawyer will tell you, on either side, it's unusual that a juror would be expressive like that. They're usually stoic. But my concern is that, so here we have a situation where a juror is expressing a position which one can interpret as being favorable to the defense —

THE COURT: Prior to deliberations, however, which, as I raised it yesterday, my concern is not that the jurors have, you know, thoughts; it's that it seems to be that she had a

particular attachment. Now that's not the issue right now.

And I haven't gotten a statement from the jury saying that they're unable to reach agreement. I have no idea. For all I know, they could all be in favor of the defendant right now, or they could all be in favor, including juror no. 7, with the government. I have received no information one way or the other, nor will I inquire. The issue for the court is solely that we do have I think relatively clear evidence of potential misconduct and I need to inquire. I will do it lightly.

MR. PITTELL: Well --

THE COURT: I understand you object.

MR. PITTELL: Right. I object. I just want to --

THE COURT: Okay. But I need you to do it really quickly because we're going to get these people out here.

MR. PITTELL: From my perspective, because she's affirmatively agreeing to what is on my summation, she ends up being singled out to have her criminal background checked.

None of the other jurors are checked. So by her expressing what would be interpreted as an agreement, her background is checked. So I'm concerned about the due process aspect of it, that there's a juror who appears to be in my court, or in my favor, is singled out for investigation. That's one thing.

The other concern I have is that, let's say it is right now 11 to 1 and she's the only holdout back there.

There's a potential that she's brought out, she's questioned.

I know the court's going to question her lightly. I have no doubt about that, okay, but she's still going to be brought out, she's going to be questioned. She may feel intimidated and then go back and change her vote, or the other jurors — let's say it's, you know, 9 to 3 and there's two others with her. She's brought out, she's brought back in. The other two that are in favor might feel, wow, if we're siding for the defense, look what's going to happen.

THE COURT: This comes up whenever there are indications of juror misconduct. Number one, the court is required to investigate those, and there are cases where the court has declined to do so and that has been held to be reversible error. The manner of the investigation, I agree, is very important.

In addition to that, however, this does come up where people have to be questioned, and one just tries to do it as carefully as possible. We don't know and will not know what the split of the vote is, so hypotheticals about what it could be or might be and how it might impact that I think can't get us anywhere at this point. I hear your view, which is you would rather we don't proceed. We have to proceed, and we will proceed. And we'll take it from there.

I will tell you I'm strongly concerned about this juror because of the number of arrests for, among other things, narcotics, and it is certainly an area of inquiry. It's

certainly something which you folks should have known about in selecting the jurors, in deciding how you were going to use peremptories, as well as the cause challenges, which of course would have been posed. But let's find out if we've got the right person first, and before she is formally dismissed from the panel, we'll talk again.

So what we need to do is to get her I think out here and into the box. If you think it would be lighter, we can do it over at sidebar. I'm happy to do it either way,

Mr. Pittell. If you think that there is some way in which having her sit in the seat no. 1 is too intimidating, which is the way I would normally do it, in open court in particular so that the defendant can hear what's going on, then, you know, I would be happy to do it the other way.

MR. PITTELL: I think since the courtroom is empty and there's no other jurors, actually, she could sit maybe in her own seat. That would be fine.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's do it that way.

MR. PITTELL: Can I just suggest one other issue that we should at least give some consideration?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PITTELL: I mean, this is the first time I saw the questionnaire.

THE COURT: Yes. I only pulled it this morning after receiving the government's letter.

MR. PITTELL: The question is, you know, if signing this is a criminal offense and there's potential that she made a false statement on it, should she have counsel? As well as if her silence to your question posited to the panel, "Has anybody been arrested," while she was under oath, if her silence to that potentially subjects her to criminal exposure, I question whether she should have counsel. I mean, I say that almost because -- I say it as my obligation as an attorney and, you know, obviously she's not my client, I have a client here, but, you know, when I see somebody who could potentially be placed in jeopardy, we should at least talk about it.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Poscablo?

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, rather than going back to the ranch, I brought part of the ranch over here. My supervisor is in the audience. And I think it's the government's position that we would not use any part of her answers to your Honor against her today.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. POSCABLO: And we can affirmatively say that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Let's go ahead and bring out juror no. 7. We'll sit her in her normal place.

(Pause)

THE COURT: My deputy was asking about her belongings, and I said she could leave them in the room.

1 (Pause) 2 (Juror no. 7 present in the courtroom) 3 THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Kearse. 4 JUROR: Good morning. 5 THE COURT: All right. We've got --JUROR: Should I sit down? 6 7 THE COURT: Please sit down, yes. Thank you. We've got juror no. 7 here, which is Ms. Barbara 8 9 Kearse, is that right? 10 JUROR: Mm-hmm. 11 THE COURT: Is that K-E-A-R-S-E? 12 JUROR: Yes. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. From time to time the court 14 has to ask individual jurors questions, and so I need to ask 15 you a few questions. I'm sorry. I know you're sitting out here and you're in the box and you're all alone there in the 16 17 box. We thought we'd put you in your seat so at least you had 18 the familiarity of your seat. 19 JUROR: All right. Thank you. 20 THE COURT: All right. What's your birthdate? 21 JUROR: 10/30/59. 22 THE COURT: And what is your current home address and 23 then the home address just before that? 24 1314 Seneca Avenue, Bronx, New York. And the JUROR:

other one was 2280 Bathgate, Bronx, New York.

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               THE COURT: All right. Now have you ever been
      arrested before?
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               JUROR: Yeah.
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               THE COURT: All right. And how many times have you
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     been arrested, approximately?
               JUROR: Once.
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               THE COURT: Just once?
               JUROR: Yes.
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               THE COURT: And have you ever been convicted of a
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      felony?
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               JUROR: Yes.
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               THE COURT: And did you serve time in jail for that?
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               JUROR: Yes.
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               THE COURT: And were your civil rights restored?
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               JUROR: Yes.
               THE COURT: And did you go through a process to have
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      that occur?
               JUROR: Yes.
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               THE COURT: And what did you do? Did you get a
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      certificate of some sort?
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               JUROR: I did, but at this point I wouldn't know where
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      it is if you asked me to go and find it.
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               THE COURT: But your best recollection is that you got
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      your --
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JUROR: Yes, yeah.

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1 THE COURT: -- civil rights restored. JUROR: Yes, and I got my records sealed. 2 3 THE COURT: All right. And now on your juror 4 questionnaire that you filled out downstairs on the very first 5 day that you came --6 JUROR: Yes. 7 THE COURT: -- in question no. 6, it asked whether you'd ever been convicted of a felony, and you checked no. 8 9 JUROR: I did that because when they sealed my case, 10 she said that it's so old and outdated, just put no because that's how old it is. 11 12 THE COURT: Who told you that? 13 The lady in the district attorney's office JUROR: 14 where I went to get my records sealed. 15 THE COURT: All right. So that was not somebody in 16 our jury office. 17 JUROR: Oh, no, no. 18 THE COURT: So they told you that if in the future 19 you're asked about whether you'd been convicted of a felony, 20 you would just say no? 21 JUROR: Yes. 22 THE COURT: All right. Now are you sure you've only 23 ever been arrested once? 24 JUROR: Yes. I went to jail once. 25 THE COURT: Well, putting aside being in jail, have

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you been arrested on other occasions?
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                      Twice. I got in trouble, I got arrested, they
               JUROR:
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      let me come home, and then when I came home, I left New York,
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      and I came back and they caught me.
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               THE COURT: All right. And what was that conviction
      for?
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               JUROR: A drug case.
               THE COURT: What kind of drugs?
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               JUROR: Crack cocaine.
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               THE COURT: All right. And putting aside the
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      questionnaire that you filled out, during the voir dire
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     process, do you remember when I was asking some questions of
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      the group of 12 sitting there?
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               JUROR:
                      Yes.
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               THE COURT: And one of the questions I asked was,
      "Have you ever been charged with a crime?"
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               JUROR: Okay.
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               THE COURT: And you didn't raise your hand.
                      No, I didn't.
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               JUROR:
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               THE COURT: Was there any particular reason that you
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     didn't raise your hand?
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               JUROR: Because the case is so old, it doesn't make a
     difference.
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               THE COURT: Okay. All right. So you heard the
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      question, is that right?
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1 JUROR: Yeah, I heard the question. THE COURT: All right. You just thought that you 2 3 didn't need to answer it yes? 4 JUROR: Yes. 5 THE COURT: All right. Have you spoken with any of 6 the members of the jury, the other 11, about your --7 JUROR: No. 8 THE COURT: -- criminal history? 9 JUROR: No. 10 THE COURT: And have you spoken with either of the alternates about your criminal history? 11 12 JUROR: No. 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Kearse. 14 may step down. Thank you very much. 15 JUROR: All right. Thank you. THE COURT: Oh, Ms. Kearse, I'm going to have you just 16 17 wait over there, outside the room, while I talk to counsel just 18 for a moment before you go back in and join everybody. 19 JUROR: All right. 20 (Juror no. 7 excused from the courtroom) 21 THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from counsel on 22 your views as to how to proceed. I have my belief, but let me hear from you folks. 23 24 MR. POSCABLO: Judge, I think the government's 25 position, as outlined in its letter, now that we've learned

that it's the same Ms. Kearse, that she should be dismissed and that alternate juror no. 1 should be called back to replace her. Whether she willingly or unknowingly lied to the court on two occasions, based on representations made by some other representative in another agency or courthouse is irrelevant. The point is that unfortunately she did lie, and it's clear from her statements to your Honor and also her indications on the juror form and also in answer to your Honor's questions in voir dire.

THE COURT: Mr. Poscablo, how many arrests do you believe the information you have provided to the court indicates?

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, I counted ten, and of the ten, seven were sealed, and my understanding is things are sealed if someone's stopped, taken in handcuffs, and there's some sort of declination to prosecute. Sometimes that happens that cases are sealed because of the age of the person who's placed under arrest; sometimes it's because it's an unlawful arrest; sometimes it's because, you know, the prosecuting agency decides not to go through with it.

THE COURT: And what dates do you have for those arrests?

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, unfortunately, I don't think I have a copy of it right now, but give me one second.

(Pause)

MR. POSCABLO: Sorry, your Honor.

2 (Pause)

MR. POSCABLO: Okay. Your Honor, I have arrests dated May 1, 2010; April 24, 2010; March 17, 2000; February 16, 1999; October 20, 1998; March 6, 1998; October 30, 1994; July 4, 1994; June 17, 1991; and there's a final arrest, your Honor — one moment — June 17, 1986.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pittell.

MR. PITTELL: We don't know if it's her on all those arrests the government read. I mean, we've been provided with two reports. One is just an NYPD arrest report which lists her name, it lists different addresses. The criminal history report, the one that's often given in discovery of a defendant's criminal history, that one only indicates one arrest, the one she spoke about. Her answers to the questions, in my opinion, clearly show there is no juror misconduct and —

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Pittell, you would agree I think -- well, let me ask you. Would you agree that, assuming that these arrests are of the same individual, that she has just lied to the court and indicated that she'd only been arrested for the felony? I mean, just now, under my questioning just now.

MR. PITTELL: Yes, if it can be verified that she is the same person who was arrested on all of these, but unless -THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Poscablo for a proffer on

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why he believes it's the same person.

MR. POSCABLO: Your Honor, first, this is a NYSID report. My understanding, from speaking with Special Agent Reynolds, who used to be an officer of the NYPD, is that every time a person is arrested, they're fingerprinted, and that's how they come up with the fact that this is the same individual. So I think our understanding is that the same Barbara Kearse was fingerprinted every time, and that would make her this person.

Another indication that this is the same Barbara
Kearse who is juror no. 7 is, it's the same date of birth that
Ms. Kearse indicated, and every single one of the addresses are
in the Bronx, and at least as to the two most recent arrests
that I noted for your Honor, which are the arrests in May of
2010 and April 2010, although the defendant's address is
different, I would note that they're both at Bathgate Avenue in
the Bronx, and her address that she listed at the time of those
arrests was 2280 Bathgate, and she indicated to your Honor both
on her form and also during your Honor's questioning this
morning that her address now or used to be 2305 or 2280
Bathgate Avenue.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I just wanted to know why you thought it was the same person.

So based upon that information, Mr. Pittell?

MR. PITTELL: It doesn't convince me it's necessarily

the same person. It could have been somebody --

THE COURT: Well, let me just tell you it's enough for me to be convinced that it's the same person. So I think we ought to go with the view that the court believes that there is a sufficient indication that it's the same person, that the court is basing its thinking on that fact.

MR. PITTELL: I think we should bring her back here, ask her if she was arrested in 2010.

THE COURT: Let me just ask you, is there anything else you want to say?

MR. PITTELL: Yes. I think she should be fingerprinted because --

THE COURT: You think she should be fingerprinted?

MR. PITTELL: I think she should be printed and a rap sheet should be run then.

THE COURT: Well, do you think that that would be something where, after that had occurred, you'd want that juror back in the room? I don't think so, not based upon the fact that you wanted her to sit in seat no. 7. I mean --

MR. PITTELL: Well, Judge, this report does not confirm, conclusively confirm that it's her. The NYSID rap sheets are often in error, people often have the same NYSID number, people use other people's IDs when they're arrested.

THE COURT: All right. Let's bring her out and ask her if she admits to these other arrests. Let me have the

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marshal bring in juror no. 7 again.
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               (Juror no. 7 present in the courtroom)
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               THE COURT: Hi, Ms. Kearse. I'm going to ask you
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      about some other dates and ask you if you were arrested on
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      those dates. Putting aside whether there were convictions.
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               JUROR: Okay.
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               THE COURT: How about May 1, 2010?
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               JUROR: Yeah.
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               THE COURT: Okay. April 24, 2010?
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               JUROR: I don't remember that one.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Then there's a May 2000?
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               JUROR:
                      No.
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               THE COURT: February 16, 1999.
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               JUROR: That was the last time I got in trouble
      besides that.
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               THE COURT: October 20, 1998?
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17
                      That was the first time I got in trouble.
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               THE COURT: Okay. March 6, 1998?
               JUROR: I don't remember that.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               JUROR: I was getting ready to say, that's the only
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      case I know about.
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               THE COURT: All right. October 30, 1994?
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               JUROR:
                      No.
               THE COURT: How about July 4<sup>th</sup> holiday, 1994, does
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that ring any bells?
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               JUROR:
                      No.
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               THE COURT: Okay. How about June 17, 1991?
                      I don't remember that one.
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               THE COURT: How about June 17, 1986 case?
              JUROR: No.
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              THE COURT: You can't remember any of those?
              JUROR: No, that's going too far back.
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              THE COURT: What's that?
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              JUROR: You're going too far back.
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               THE COURT: Okay. How old were you the first time you
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      were arrested? We will put aside dates for a moment and try
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     to --
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               JUROR: Let's see. The first time I really got in
      trouble, I was like 12. I had a fight. Then after that, I
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     don't know. I remember something in the '90s. That's what I
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17
      remember.
18
               THE COURT: And then how many times in the '90s,
19
      approximately?
20
               JUROR: Well, I got arrested once. Whether it was
21
      twice for the same charge --
22
               THE COURT: And that was in the '90s?
23
              JUROR: Yeah.
24
              THE COURT: And then you remember something in April
25
      of 2010 or May of 2010?
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1
               JUROR: Yes, ma'am. Me and my stepdaughter got into
 2
      an argument.
 3
               THE COURT: Okay. And you said you remembered one in
 4
      1998. You said June 1998 was the first time you got in
5
      trouble?
6
               JUROR: Yeah.
 7
               THE COURT: And that was different than the felony you
      were convicted of?
8
9
               JUROR: Yeah.
10
               THE COURT: What was that for; do you remember?
11
               JUROR: Dealing.
12
               THE COURT: Okay. And you don't recall any of the
13
      1994, the 1991, 1986?
               JUROR: No.
14
15
               THE COURT: All right. So there's the October 1998,
      the April 24, 2010, and then the one that you do recall in
16
      1999, approximately? That's the felony.
17
               JUROR: Yeah.
18
19
               THE COURT: All right. Okay. Thank you very much.
20
               JUROR: So am I going home now?
21
               THE COURT: No. We've just got to get to the bottom
22
      of it.
              Thank you very much.
               JUROR: Well, if you all want to excuse me, I can go
23
24
     home.
25
               (Juror no. 7 excused from the courtroom)
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THE COURT: All right. Well, we've gone from one to three arrests, and we're getting I think varying and shifting stories about the arrests each time. I don't think we have a clear answer on whether or not she recalls or doesn't recall earlier arrests. So I have heard I believe quite enough in terms of the juror's demeanor. I think that she's embarrassed about some of the convictions, I think that she's not wanted to talk about them because she finds them embarrassing, but I believe that they occurred and I think, based upon how she was responding when I was going through the other dates, I would bet that if we fingerprinted her as Mr. Pittell suggests, that we would find that the others occurred as well. I certainly believe that the three are sufficient. We've gotten several different answers now on these arrests, and that concerns me.

I also will say that had I known that she'd had a crack conviction back in 1999 for a felony, irrespective of the reinstatement of her civil rights, I would have struck her for cause because of the possibility, the very strong possibility of bias. It's also possible that either of you might have used a peremptory with her, but the court itself, not having had that information, was prevented from heading off possible bias at the pass.

The court believes it's appropriate to dismiss this juror and to replace her with alternate no. 1.

Apart from what you folks have already argued, do you

have additional positions that you would like to put down on the record?

MR. POSCABLO: No, your Honor, but one thing that just came to mind is, given sort of the way this juror expresses herself, you know, it may make sense not to allow her to go back into the jury room. Maybe we can give her her belongings. I'm just worried that she would mumble something like, "They're sending me home," "They're sending me home because they found out about my record," or something. I just wouldn't want that to happen.

THE COURT: We can take care of that, Mr. Poscablo.

Mr. Pittell, is there anything else you would like to add to the record at this point?

MR. PITTELL: Judge, I was hoping you would ask her one other question, simply that now that she's acknowledged that she remembers being arrested two other times, why, when you asked her the first time, "Have you ever been arrested," she said no.

THE COURT: Well, then I would have gotten only the reason for lying to the court but I would have nonetheless been left with a lie. I hear your point. I don't think that was necessary to a determination as to whether she was being truthful or not. I think she was being decidedly untruthful, and, to state the obvious, she also did say in response, in the first questioning that I did of her this morning, that she had

heard my question during voir dire about whether she'd ever been arrested before but she hadn't thought she needed to answer it because it was so old. Now of course 2010 is not so very old. 2010 is relatively recently. She was even limiting that answer simply to the one arrest and not the multiple arrests. So it's just too much. It's too shifting. If you were on the other side of this, there's no doubt that this would be enough. And I purposely did not inquire as to whether she could be biased or unbiased because at this point, given that they're in deliberations, that would be inappropriate to go there.

Anything else you'd like to say on the record?

MR. PITTELL: No, I understand. The reason why I mentioned it was I thought it would at least complete the record if we had her explanation for why, a few minutes before, she answered no to the question and then she answered it yes. Again, whether it was under embarrassment or whether or not she felt it was not important or whatever the reason was, she obviously had a reason.

THE COURT: All right. I do have one other question. I just want to ask the government, or Mr. Reynolds, if he can answer directly, whether or not the report that Mr. Poscablo referenced, the NYSID report, is one which is relied upon in the performance of the normal duties and responsibilities of the FBI.

MR. REYNOLDS: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

The court is going to dismiss juror no. 7, based upon juror misconduct, based upon the court's determination that there are a number of instances where the juror has been untruthful with the court, starting potentially with the questionnaire, though there's a possible explanation for that, but certainly in the voir dire process and then most recently during the questioning this morning before the court. The court is very concerned about that. In addition, the court believes that the information the court now has relating to the felony conviction indicates a possible area of concern that the court would have inquired into further had it been aware of it at the time. So if there had been a positive answer to question no. 6, the court very likely, if the court had become aware of that, would have inquired at the time.

With that said, I will have my deputy tell the marshal that the juror can go home -- she herself has previewed that as a possibility -- and ask the marshal to collect her belongings. And when alternate no. 1 arrives, we will then call all the jurors in and I will proceed as I had indicated.

Is there any objection to that process?

MR. POSCABLO: None from the government, your Honor.

MR. PITTELL: I think my objection is clearly stated on the record.

1 THE COURT: Yes. You have your objection to the dismissal of juror no. 7. Do you have any objection to the 2 3 manner of proceeding now? 4 MR. PITTELL: No. 5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 6 We can go ahead and proceed in that manner. Perhaps 7 we need one more thing, which is, as the other 11 won't really know what to do right now, I do suggest that in the meantime 8 9 what I do is we call out the 11 and just say, you know, we're 10 waiting for alternate no. 1 to arrive, as soon as he does, 11 we'll call you folks out here and you can recommence, but don't 12 deliberate until you've got a full group of 12. 13 MR. POSCABLO: That makes sense, Judge. 14 MR. PITTELL: I agree. 15 THE COURT: All right. So when Joe comes back in, I'll ask him, after no. 7's possessions are removed, to have 16 17 the other 11 come in. We'll take a break until then. 18 MR. POSCABLO: Thank you, Judge. 19 THE COURT: Thank you. 20 (Recess) 21 (In open court) 22 THE COURT: All right. Let's bring out the 11. 23 (Jury present) 24 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, let's 25 all be seated for just a moment.

We have called upon alternate no. 1, who was en route, who will be taking the spot there of juror no. 7. As I said yesterday during instructions, it sometimes occurs that we need to call upon the alternates, and we have done so here. I instruct you that you should not speculate as to the reasons for that. There could be a variety of reasons for that, and you just shouldn't speculate about it one way or the other.

Now I don't want you to deliberate, in fact, I instruct you not to deliberate until you've got alternate 1 here. He's on his way. I hope he's here in 20 minutes or thereabouts. It could be half an hour. But he's on his way. And so when he arrives, we'll see you folks for another minute, I'll have you folks come out, we'll have a full complement, and we'll send you into the room to start deliberating. All right? I apologize for this delay. Thank you.

We'll see you in a few minutes as soon as this fellow gets here. Thank you.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise as the jury leaves.

(Jury excused)

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, as soon as alternate no. 1, the new juror no. 7, arrives, we will reconvene and then give the instructions that they should commence their deliberations as a group of 12. In fact, he's right here right now. He just arrived.

Can you bring them on out again?

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, one thing. I think your Honor was already going to go there. I think the court has to instruct the jury that they need to start from the beginning.

THE COURT: Oh, yes. I mean, I think I used the word "commence," and I've also suggested to you folks that they need to deliberate on each count. They need to effectively start over again --

MR. POSCABLO: Right.

THE COURT: -- from the beginning. Yes.

MR. POSCABLO: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't we see if we can bring them all in.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, let's all be seated.

Alternate no. 1, I want to thank you for joining us. As I had indicated yesterday, it is from time to time the case that we call upon the alternates to deliberate. When that occurs, the jury is not to speculate on why. And also, it's important that you all now understand that you should treat the deliberations as beginning. You should treat the deliberations as starting from the beginning so that alternate no. 1, now juror no. 7, will have a full opportunity to deliberate with you on each of the counts that are charged in the indictment, so that, alternate no. 1, you're not coming into something in

the middle. You will essentially all be starting from scratch.

With that said, you are now free to go deliberate in

the jury room. And you all remember my instructions from yesterday. We'll see you only when you have questions.

Otherwise, it will be at the end of the day. Thank you.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise as the jury leaves.

(The jury retired to deliberate, 10:24 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, are there any other issues you'd like to raise with me?

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, one thing that Ms. Chen pointed out to me, one piece of evidence that we didn't send back that isn't drugs or ammunition or a firearm is the demonstrative that your Honor accepted into evidence as Government Exhibit 1003-A, and also the revisions on it based on the handwriting of the DNA expert Ms. Cooke which we offered as 1003-R. With the court's permission, I'd like to send it back.

THE COURT: Mr. Pittell?

MR. PITTELL: No objection.

THE COURT: Then that may be given to the marshal to be put into the jury room.

MR. POSCABLO: And nothing further.

THE COURT: Before alternate no. 1 came out, he just asked Joe if he could speak to him, and Joe I instructed not to speak to him. He is now a juror who is deliberating and he can only can communicate in writing in the same process as everyone

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If he has paperwork issues, we'll deal with those in due
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 2
      course.
 3
               All right. Was there anything else we needed to deal
 4
      with?
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               MR. POSCABLO: No, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pittell?
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               MR. PITTELL: No.
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               THE COURT: So you folks know the process. Stay
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      within close touch and let Joe know where you're going to be,
      and I'll see you when we have a question or note from the jury.
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      Otherwise I won't see you until we're ready to adjourn at the
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12
      end of the day. Thank you.
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               ALL COUNSEL: Thank you.
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               (Recess pending verdict, 10:26 a.m.)
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               (Continued on next page)
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1 (At 12:05 p.m., a note was received from the jury) 2 (Jury not present) THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, let's all be seated. 3 4 The Court has received a note from the jury. It was received 5 at 12:05 today, and it is dated today 12:02. It is signed by 6 Deirdre Mov. 7 It states the following: Question 1: Please point us to the evidence that shows the existence of David's iPhone or 8 9 phone on September 2012. 10 And then it doesn't have a number two but here is the 11 second question: 12 Please point us to the evidence that shows the 13 existence of any phone owned by David other than the iPhone or 14 phone with number (305)709-8402. So this would be, I would 15 think direct, cross and any testimony relating to documentary exhibits or documentary exhibits themselves. I am assuming 16 that you folks don't off the top of your head have that. 17 18 We've marked this Court Exhibit 1. Why don't you folks take this, confer, come up with what the right universe 19 20 is, tell Joe as soon as you've got it, I'll come out, we'll 21 look at it, and we'll give it to the jury. 22 MR. POSCABLO: OK your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Sound all right? 24 MR. POSCABLO: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Joe is going to mark it as Court Exhibit

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1, and you both can inspect it. It is my practice at the
2 conclusion of a trial to post to the docket all juror
3 questions, so don't take it with you. We can make a copy of it
4 if you'd like, but here it is if you would like to look at it

MR. POSCABLO: Thanks.

(Recess)

for now.

(Jury not present)

THE COURT: Now, during the time between the last session on the record and right now, this session on the record, I got a knock on my robing room door from Mr. Poscablo. I put my head into the courtroom so that I could see the defendant as well as defense counsel, and Mr. Poscablo indicated that the parties had conferred on the testimony but had a disagreement as to five lines.

I stated that we would get a court reporter up here, but that they should indicate on the transcript where they agreed and disagreed, and then I would come out here make this statement that I'm making right now, and we would then talk about the disagreement.

Now, I have reviewed the testimony that you folks have flagged, which is page 314/lines 23, and you've agreed on everything up to 316/line 17. Then there is a disagreement at page 316/line 18 through 25.

The first question I have is the jury's obviously

going to wonder about where is the testimony on the iPhone. So when was the iPhone referred to? I know that when Mr. Delva was arrested, he referred to the iPhone. I don't recall Mr. Accilien, whose testimony I have before me, having referred to the iPhone, so I'm not surprised there is nothing in him, but where is the iPhone referenced?

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, I think the agreed upon response to question number one from the jury is there is no evidence of the existence of Mr. Delva's iPhone.

THE COURT: Wasn't there testimony from Mr. Reynolds that when he was arrested, there was an iPhone recovered at the time?

MR. POSCABLO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So that is the evidence of existence of.

MR. POSCABLO: But not in September -- I was reading it literally. It says in September of 2012. When Special Agent Reynolds arrested Mr. Delva and found the iPhone, it was in August of 2013. So I think the literal, our literal reading of that is --

THE COURT: I hear you. I understand your point. Was there any other place before the jury where the iPhone was mentioned? Have you folks done any search in the transcript?

MR. POSCABLO: We have, your Honor, and we can double check again, but I believe the only time it was discussed was during Special Agent Reynolds' testimony.

THE COURT: I do recall that we had a number of 1 sessions outside of the presence of the jury where it was 2 3 raised. 4 Mr. Pittell, are you in agreement that that was the 5 only time it was raised? 6 MR. PITTELL: Yes. 7 THE COURT: All right. Then the only other phone that was mentioned on the record in front of the jury was the HTC 8 9 phone, and that testimony was exclusively by Mr. Accilien. 10 That appears to me to be what you folks have handed me. 11 MR. POSCABLO: That's correct. 12 THE COURT: Is that agreed? 13 MR. PITTELL: Yes. 14 MR. POSCABLO: That's correct. 15 THE COURT: All right. Then we turn to the next. MR. PITTELL: Regarding the other phone, there is 16 17 another disagreement that come up while you were coming out. 18 THE COURT: Let me finish this point. If it is not related to identifying the testimony, we will certainly take it 19 20 up, but let's get this resolved. 21 Now, the five lines that you folks disagree on, as I 22 said, lines 20 through 25 of page 316 are not responsive to the 23 jury's question, though I certainly understand why the

defendant would want to include them, because it refers to

Mr. Accilien's use of the 305 phone. And that is a theme, a

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1 defense theme.

The jurors know how to ask for all of the testimony relating to Mr. Accilien yen's use of the 305 phone, and they can certainly ask for that. If that were the question, there's a lot more that we would have to put in than just those five lines. So, I am not going to include the five lines because they are not directly responsive to the question.

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, we're talking about -- Judge, I think I might have said five lines, but it's actually more.

THE COURT: It's lines 20 -- I'm sorry, it's 18 through 25. It's actually seven lines.

MR. POSCABLO: Right.

THE COURT: So that is my ruling on those seven lines.

Now, before we leave this and go to the issue Mr. Pittell would like to raise, let me just state that I would intend, if I don't have any disagreement, to say to the jury that at the time of Mr. Delva's arrest in August of 2014, he was arrested with an iPhone -- 2013 -- and that's where they heard the word iPhone, but there is no testimony or evidence -- and the parties are in agreement on this fact -- as to an iPhone in 2012

MR. POSCABLO: That's correct.

THE COURT: Mr. Pittell?

MR. PITTELL: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Poscablo?

MR. POSCABLO: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: That way they're not confused as to why they heard the word iPhone and don't have it in what I am going to be providing to them.

Now, the other issue that, Mr. Pittell, you would like to raise, does it relate to the testimony that we are about to give to the jury or something else? Otherwise, we can call the jury out, deal with this, send them back, and then deal with your other issue

MR. PITTELL: It relates to the testimony.

THE COURT: What is the application?

MR. PITTELL: The testimony is Mr. Accilien referenced that Mr. Delva had an HTC phone. Government Exhibit 2000-K, which the government has referred to as a selfie, was put in pursuant to the stipulation which put the phone and the memory card into evidence, and the stipulation said that 2000-K along with other images were on the memory card.

The memory card is in evidence. I have the report of the memory card. The data on the memory card indicates that the photo 2000-K was taken with an HTC camera. And it has the date that it was taken. And that information is on the memory card. So that information is in evidence. So I think the excerpt from the report should be given to the jury or the jury could be told that Government Exhibit 2000-K is on the memory card, which is actually on the stipulation, was taken with an

HTC camera, on April 6, 2012 at 12:17:36 seconds p.m. 1 2 THE COURT: This goes to the second question, would be 3 your point. 4 MR. PITTELL: I'm trying to print out the report, but the report is 150 pages, and for some reason the program I 5 have, I can't print out an individual page. I can show you on 6 7 my laptop. 8 THE COURT: No. Just repeat to me, if you would, 9 Mr. Pittell, it's Exhibit 2000-K. 10 MR. PITTELL: Right. 11 THE COURT: 2000-K, which is -- first of all, let me 12 back up. There is an HTC phone, and that HTC phone is the 305 13 phone. Is that right? 14 MR. PITTELL: No. The 305 phone is the Huawei phone. 15 THE COURT: The Huawei phone. 16 MR. PITTELL: The HTC phone is referenced by 17 Mr. Accilien in his testimony. 18 THE COURT: All right. So, the 305 phone is the 19 Huawei phone. The HTC phone, and it had, I take it, a 20

different number than 305?

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MR. POSCABLO: No. The HTC phone, your Honor -- if I may interrupt, the HTC phone is the phone that the defense has been arguing about as being the second phone that was in Mr. Delva's possession that Special Agent Reynolds and the government informed your Honor in a proffer that we never found that phone; we didn't take that phone.

And the only piece of evidence testimony-wise regarding the HTC phone is in what we provided to the Court in pages 314 to 316. So I think the issue here, if I may, Judge-THE COURT: Yes, translate for me.

MR. POSCABLO: Yes. Mr. Pittell is referring to what was referred to in the court as a selfie. It's a photograph of Mr. Delva. The report that was provided to the defense regarding the metadata regarding that photograph shows that it was taken by an HTC phone. I think it might even say the time and date that it was taken.

THE COURT: I think I get the point.

MR. POSCABLO: Right. Well, so I think what

Mr. Pittell wants is he wants to offer not this photograph, but
the report showing that the photograph was taken by an HTC
phone.

Here is the government's position on it, Judge.

First, the only evidence or informant testimony regarding the

HTC phone is what we provided to the Court, and it's clear from

the testimony of Mr. Accilien that Mr. Delva didn't own that

phone until well after the robbery. I think he said it's

months after the robbery. Let me double-check.

The line is 11 to 13:

"Q. OK. But at some point, did he have a phone which was an HTC brand phone?

"A. Yes, this was like months after the robbery."

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So that's one issue.

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4 incorrect.

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The second issue, your Honor, is that Mr. Pittell is

The memory card attached to the 305 phone is not in evidence. The stipulation between the parties -- and we could put it up on the screen -- offers Government Exhibit 2000 --200 -- 2000, which is the cell phone and only the cell phone.

The stipulation makes reference to another memory card, right? A memory card file inside the phone, but it doesn't offer the memory card as part of Government Exhibit 2000.

THE COURT: All right. But the 2000-K, which is the selfie apparently is associated with a report which has metadata associated with that report which indicates that that 2000-K selfie was taken in June of 2012, and that it was taken with an HTC camera.

MR. POSCABLO: Camera.

THE COURT: Now, is there any debate that an HTC camera is the same thing as a camera resident inside an HTC Is it a point without a difference?

MR. POSCABLO: I actually can tell you I don't know, I think Special Agent Reynolds is saying that he believes you're right, but I don't know for a fact that it's true.

MR. PITTELL: I don't think there's any difficulty.

Below it, there's a model number. If we looked at the model number, we would see it corresponds to a telephone.

THE COURT: There was a point in time when there was a selfie taken of the defendant with an HTC phone?

MR. PITTELL: Right.

THE COURT: I think that's what we're saying, right?

In June of 2012, the defendant took a selfie with an HTC phone.

MR. POSCABLO: It was April of 2012.

THE COURT: April of 2012.

I think to be fair, since you folks have focused on the selfie as indicative of the possession and control of the 305 phone and the jury has asked for evidence — not just testimony, but evidence — that shows the existence of any phone owned by David other than the iPhone or the 305. Now, the only issue there is owned by David. But this is circumstantial evidence similar to that which you've put forward for ownership of the 305 phone, ownership of the HTC phone.

So, what I would suggest is that we do the following:

I handle question one in the manner that we have suggested,

which is, I will point out that the iPhone didn't exist. There
is no evidence in the record that there was an iPhone in

September of 2012.

As to the second question, there is the testimony that we are going to give them, and that the jury should be aware

E9hQdel2 1 that there is a photograph that was on a memory card in the 305 phone that had indicated on it in the report associated with 2 3 that which is in evidence as 2000-K, an indication that there was a selfie taken by the defendant on an HTC phone in June of 4 5 2012 -- April 2012. 6 MR. POSCABLO: I think your statement is accurate, 7 your Honor. I just want to be clear that we do not believe 8 that either the memory card or the report are in evidence. 9 THE COURT: The report's not in evidence? 10 MR. POSCABLO: No. The report is not in evidence. 11 THE COURT: Hold on. I'm relying upon the fact that 12 the report is in evidence. 13 MS. GERACI: It is not in evidence. It was not

offered by the government or the defense.

THE COURT: So there is no evidence as to the metadata in evidence.

MR. POSCABLO: That's right.

THE COURT: The only thing that is in evidence is the actual selfie, but the metadata is not in evidence?

MR. POSCABLO: Correct.

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MR. PITTELL: The memory card is in evidence.

THE COURT: It is apparently not, according to the government it was not.

MR. PITTELL: I saw the phone, and the phone was put into evidence. That was the whole point of the dispute as to

whether or not it was in the phone or not in the phone. The phone is in evidence. The memory card was in the phone. To now sit and here we had this whole discussion about the memory card being taken out of the HTC phone and put into the Huawei phone. And to say now it's not really in the Huawei phone that's a little disingenuous.

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, it's actually the opposite. In fact, Mr. Pittell has strenuously argued that that memory card to his client, his argument to the client is that that's not the memory card; that that memory card that's actually in the phone is not the memory card that belonged in that phone. He's argued and moved to have that entire thing suppressed because his argument is Special Agent Reynolds or some other member from law enforcement took that memory card from some other phone and put it in this phone. I think the language is very specific about what is being offered by the government because I think there was a dispute about this memory card and whether it was the memory card attached to this phone.

THE COURT: Here is the issue I have. The issue I have is if the report is not in evidence, I don't have any way of rendering the phone operable, having the jury then go into the phone to get the metadata out. I can't then recite for the jury a proffer on that data that's not in evidence. I think that would be inappropriate.

So I can't make the statement that I was suggesting

that I would make about the selfie. So the only evidence that we are left with is the evidence in the record which is that which is contained within the testimony of Mr. Accilien.

Was there any other issue we had to raise?

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, can I just have a moment to talk to my team a second?

(Pause)

MR. POSCABLO: What I had asked my team, your Honor, so the record is clear, is whether there was any other evidence from other cell phones or from the investigation that was offered to the jury reflecting a phone number associated with David that could have been found, let's say, in Trevor Cole's phone. And the response I got is no. The only numbers associated with David were the 305 number and then the later number which was in the iPhone unless Mr. Pittell can think of another number.

MR. PITTELL: No, but getting back to that point, I think the memory card needs to be rendered operable then to the jury, and the jury needs to view the photos and the data that is on memory card on the phone.

THE COURT: You're asking to reopen the record. The application prior to trial was to ensure that the phones were not operable when they were given to the jury, and the Court did ensure that. The phones went into evidence in a non-operable form at the defense request. So I am not going to

re-open the record at this point to change that. 1 2 So the application is denied. 3 Let's bring out the jury so that we can deal with the 4 issue of the note. The jury has taken a short break. As soon as they 5 6 reassemble, we'll gather them together and have the marshal 7 bring them out. Let's continue as soon as they are gathered. 8 Then I go true the response with them. 9 (Recess) 10 THE COURT: Let's all be seated. The jury is ready 11 for us, but I understand that there is another issue that one 12 of you would like to raise. 13 Mr. Pittell. 14 MR. PITTELL: Judge, I also think in response to the 15 note, it said 2005, paragraph 1C should be read to the jury. 16 THE COURT: 2005 paragraph 1C should be read? Can 17 someone please hand it up to me? MR. POSCABLO: We have it up on your screen. 18 19 MR. PITTELL: It's actually paragraph one and 20 paragraph C. 21 THE COURT: Now, the memory card found in government 22 2000 is the memory card found in the 305 phone, correct? 23 MR. POSCABLO: Correct. 24 THE COURT: And were taken by other cameras. Now that

paragraph references 2000-I through L, S, S1 and V. Can I see

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those exhibits? Do we have them?

MR. POSCABLO: We could pull them up Judge, if you want?

THE COURT: All I have that in my binder is 2000-H. I have that now. So 2000 I, let me just turn to -- through L. Can you go back to the stip? Sorry. I just want to make sure. Those are the selfies. Then let me look at S, S1 and V. I think that I would like you folks to address the phrase "owned by David."

What I would like to do is, I think, my preference, but I am still thinking about this; is to read this portion of the stip or, you know refer the jury to this portion of the stip as suggested by Mr. Pittell but suggest to the jury that we are doing that, but -- and the but -- what follows that word "but" would be some phrase that does not indicate that it refers to any phone owned by David. It could be any phone. It could be another phone.

MR. POSCABLO: That's right.

THE COURT: But the "owned by David," I think, and referencing it "owned by David" is not necessarily the case.

As you yourself argued, it could have been attached to an image -- I'm looking at Mr. Pittell when I said "you" there -- that was then taken into a memory of a phone.

So, referencing simply the existence of the photographs that are taken by other cameras, the jury can then,

I think, look at them and determine for themselves whether the selfies are indicative of ownership or not. Let them draw their own conclusion. But, for instance, the picture of the scale may have been taken into the memory, and it may or may not have been taken on a phone owned by David, etc.

So what I will do is refer to them to: Here is some other evidence of phones -- some other evidence of photographs -- I guess what I would say is, in excess. I wouldn't say that. Strike that phrase.

In addition, the Court one point to you paragraph 1-C of 3005 with the following caveat: Those indicate that there were photographs taken with other cameras. Whether or not those cameras were telephones owned by Mr. Delva or is not something that is referenced in that stipulation.

MR. PITTELL: I would just say it is a conclusion that you can draw from. You will have to draw from what is in evidence at the trial.

THE COURT: So here is what I would propose to do then. Were you standing up, Mr. Poscablo?

MR. POSCABLO: I would like to hear what you are going to propose.

THE COURT: What I propose to do is I to say to the jury: We discussed question number one on the iPhone.

Question number two: Refer the jury to transcript portions which we've already all discussed here. Then I will

say: In addition, the Court refers the jury to the stipulation at Government Exhibit 3005, in particular paragraph C, but with the following caveat: Your question was worded: Evidence that shows the existence of any other phone owned by David, and whether or not the cameras that took these photographs were on a phone owned by David is not referenced in the stip.

MS. GERACI: And there is no evidence of that, Judge.

I think our position was that this stipulation should not be read, so that your Honor knows what our position is.

out is: One, why the government wouldn't want the photographs to have been on a camera owned by David since they are the selfies, and so why the government is sort of fighting that I am a little bit unclear of because if you are citing to the selfies, as Mr. Pittell has requested, in paragraph 1-C and the selfies, Mr. Pittell wants to indicate, were on a phone owned by David, that strikes me as something that you would think the government wouldn't be fighting; the government would be embracing because it is suggesting that he prior phones, he somehow managed to get them onto the 305 phone. The jury can draw a reasonable — they can draw a number of different inferences, one of which is he took the memory from his prior phones and put it on the 305 phone.

You sure you want to do this, Mr. Pittell?

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, you taught me to sit down, so

1 | I'm going to sit down.

THE COURT: As I'm thinking it through, it strikes me--

MR. PITTELL: I'm satisfied with you just reading the stipulation and giving the caveat. I think that reading the stipulation is reasonable within answering the question.

THE COURT: But the "by other cameras" you're suggesting is responsive to the question -- is evidence of the existence of any phone owned by David because that's why we're reading it, right?

MR. PITTELL: Right, because there's selfies in evidence. Selfies are taken with a phone. You can call it a camera, whatever you want. It's taken with a camera in a phone. So I think that it is certainly circumstantial evidence that it's his phone because it's a selfie. People do take selfies on other people's phones, but people also take selfies on their own phone. So, I think the best way to approach it is just read the stipulation.

THE COURT: I am not going to read the stipulation. I will refer them to the stipulation because they got the stipulation in the back there.

MR. PITTELL: Mr. Poscablo, you sat down. Do you understand how the Court is intending to proceed?

MS. GERACI: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Let's bring out the jury. And

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the Court has received two copies of the testimony of Mr. Accilien's cross-examination. I take it that these have been reviewed by both parties and are an accurate reflection of the testimony the Court referred to?

MS. GERACI:

MR. POSCABLO: Yes, your Honor.

MR. PITTELL: Yes.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen. The Court has received a note from the jury that reads as follows:

First, it was signed by Deirdre Moy dated today's date, dated 12:02 p.m. received at 12:05 and has been marked as Court Exhibit 1.

There are two questions on this note. The first reads: Question 1: Please point us to the evidence that shows the existence of David's iPhone on September 2012. There is another question underneath that: Please point us to the evidence that shows the existence of any phone owned by David other than the iPhone or phone with number (305) 709-8402.

Now, of course, it is for you to determine what the facts are, but let me give you some guidance. In terms of the first question which point us to the evidence that shows the existence of David iPhone on September 2012, there is no such evidence. The only evidence of an iPhone was at the time of arrest in August of 2013, and that came in through Special

Agent Reynolds. So there will be nothing to provide you in response to that question.

In terms of the second question, we have a one-page -it's portions of two pages -- actually almost two pages of
testimony that we'll give you from the cross-examination of
Mr. Accilien.

In addition, I would refer you to Government Exhibit 3005, paragraph C. That's a stipulation that related to an agreement. It was an agreement of stipulated facts between the parties. So you can take a look at that as well.

All right. That was for the question: The evidence that shows the existence of any phone owned by David other than the 305 phone or the iPhone. Those are the answers.

I will have Mr. Pecorino hand this to the foreperson.

Ms. Moy, you are Juror No. 1. He will hand you two copies of it, they're identical, and you can go on back into the room.

Thank you.

(Jury continued deliberations resumed)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, is there anything else that we should go over until we get our next note?

MR. POSCABLO: Not from the government.

MR. PITTELL: Not from us. Thank you. We will adjourn until we get our next note.

(Recess)

(At 3:15 p.m., a note was received from the jury)

(Jury not present)

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THE COURT: I received a note from the jury from

Deirdre Moy dated today's date at 3:15 p.m. I received it at

3:22. I've marked it as Court Exhibit 2.

It asks two things: First, can we have playback, a -- strike that. Start over again.

Can we have a playback or transcript of number 800 prison call between Dominique Jean-Philippe and David Delva.

And then number two: Explain what "progress" means as used on pages 39 Count One, second element — which I take to be a reference to the page in the jury instructions, and then it continues — i.e., if a person learns of unlawful activity and a conspiracy surrounding it after the unlawful act, are they a co-conspirator?

That's the end of the message. I will let you folks inspect in a moment.

As to the playback of number 800, which I think is pretty clearly a reference to Government Exhibit 800, I would have them -- unless you folks object -- come out here and listen to that call again, and the transcript can be played. I think that is fairly straightforward.

Is there any objection to that?

MR. POSCABLO: None from the government, your Honor.

MR. PITTELL: None from us.

THE COURT: In terms of the second question, again,

let me read it to you again: Explain what progress means as used on pages 39, Count One, second element; i.e., if a person learns of unlawful activity and a conspiracy surrounding it —then there is an arrow down, after the unlawful act, back to text — are they a co-conspirator?

Having looked at the instructions, I think that the way progress is best defined and the way the question is asked are they a co-conspirator requires joining two pieces, from pages 38 to 39. 38 I would propose to re-read -- because sometimes it actually does make a difference when the Court re-reads it and re-reads it slowly -- to re-read either the whole first paragraph on page 39 and half of the second paragraph or just starting with the word "but" in the first paragraph down to, but not including, the "some conspirators play major roles" in the second paragraph.

In any event, the word "progress" I think is relatively clearly defined here. The issue is also a joining issue based upon their question, which is are they a co-conspirator? So that requires not only the concept of progress, but the concept of knowingly and intentionally joining. And they need to find that because even if the defendant was found to have been present as we know, even if he was present during the progress of the conspiracy, he has to have been found to have knowingly and intentionally joined it.

So I would propose to also read the fourth paragraph on page

38.

Lastly, the last thing that I would propose is that we define for them when the progress has occurred, the progress is the time frame he had to have knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy while it was in progress. The time frame while it was in progress as alleged by the government is from the time Ms. Adams was initially detained until the individuals left the apartment on Tuesday late afternoon, early evening.

MR. PITTELL: Judge, can you just -- I was having a little difficulty trying to follow you in terms of portions of the charge that you were going to read.

THE COURT: Let me go through it as I would go through it with them. That may be the easiest thing instead of walking you through my rationale.

I will preface how I am going to go through it with them with you with the initial sentence that I think their question really asks two things: I think, one, it asks for progress, but they also want to know whether or not if somebody happens to join it while it's in progress, can they be a co-conspirator. That requires that they also find that he has met the element of joining a conspiracy.

So what I would propose to do is say: Ladies and gentlemen, here's the question. I'm going to answer it for you this way: As you know, on page 39 of the jury instructions, the instructions state that: A defendant need not have joined

the conspiracy at the outset, but he must at some point during his progress have joined the conspiracy with knowledge as to its general scope and purpose. If he did join with such knowledge at any time while it was in progress, he may still be held responsible for all that was done before he joined and all that was done during the conspiracy's existence while he was a member. Indeed, each member of the conspiracy may perform separate and distinct acts and may perform them at different times.

Now, in addition to that, ladies and gentlemen, in terms of a defendant being part of a conspiracy in terms of whether or not he would become a co-conspirator, you also would need to find that he joined the conspiracy. I refer to you page 38, which is the instruction as to participation in the conspiracy. You should read the entirety of the instruction, but in particular you need to turn to paragraph four.

If you find that the conspiracy existed, and that the defendant participated intentionally and knowingly in it, the extent of the defendant's participation has no bearing on whether or not he is guilty. The fact that the defendant's participation was more limited than of that a co-conspirator should not affect your verdict.

Lastly, ladies and gentlemen, in terms of your question what does progress mean, the government has alleged that the robbery conspiracy, the kidnapping conspiracy and the

substantive crimes occurred between the period when

Ms. Jeanette Adams was first detained on September 2 through

September 4.

MS. GERACI: Your Honor, just with respect to the timing issue, the allegations — the time allegations of the conspiracy are just September 2012. Frankly, I think the conspiracy predates the moment that they sort of jumped the bounds. I think there are calls that suggest they were planning it earlier. And then certainly after they left, part of the conspiracy was to divvy up the goods that were stolen, and they were calls to suggest that as happening too.

And then pursuant to the law the government cited with respect to the two letters in the case, Exhibit 50 and 51, there is evidence to suggest the conspiracy continued any attempts to cover it up. I don't know if we want to put a time frame around that whole period or if we just want to say September 2012 or however your Honor feels comfortable.

THE COURT: I take that point. I hear that.

Mr. Pittell.

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ PITTELL:}$ I think that is going to confuse and mislead the jurors.

THE COURT: Which part?

MR. PITTELL: About saying that the progress means the period when the letters were sent.

THE COURT: Well, I think that the suggestion is that

the Court simply say the time frame is September 2012.

MS. GERACI: In or about.

THE COURT: As opposed to -- I don't think Ms. Geraci,
I'm not taking it as she would ask, and I certainly wouldn't,
go into individual events.

Another way of doing it is to say: There were events before the Labor Day weekend, certainly the Labor Day weekend, and then there were certain events after the Labor Day weekend. That would be, I think, another way of doing it. That, I think, covers the same point. I think the jury's question is fairly read as wanting to understand about somebody coming in while something is already going on and what the impact of that is.

Now, it's important that — that's why I said, you, know he's got to have joined. He can't just have come in and been around. He's got to have joined. And I think it is useful to give them a time frame, but I am fine with going with September 2012 if that is the view. Tell me about the rest of it.

MR. PITTELL: Let me just tell you what my concern is, and then we can discuss it. My concern is let's say the jury believes that he was not at Magenta Street during the time period from the abduction of Ms. Adams to the time they were released but the jury believes it's him on that phone call with Dominique Jean-Philippe. The phone call is talking about

Accilien being arrested and not saying things. The phone call is not — there is no admissions to him being there, but he's discussing criminal activity. I'm concerned that the jury might feel that that is joining the conspiracy in progress, that phone call.

THE COURT: Then perhaps what we should do if that is your concern I actually -- I hear the possibility of that, though I actually interpret it a little bit differently, but I hear that possibility. What I would suggest is that I give them perhaps the entire participation in the conspiracy instruction again because what you want to do is, I think, focus on what they have to find in order to find that he participated. So, therefore, it is really the entirety of that instruction.

So, I am happy to give that instruction, but I would do it starting with "extent of participation," go back to he's got to have joined, and give a time frame. So how about:

"You've heard evidence or there was evidence put in at trial regarding events before the Labor Day weekend, at the time

Ms. Adams was detained until she was released, or until the victims were released, and in September thereafter." And I think that is all we need to do.

MR. PITTELL: It's just there was nothing thereafter.

I mean, the letters were admitted as a co-conspirator's statement, but they weren't addressed as sort of a separate

1 theory, a separate conspiracy to cover up.

THE COURT: I don't think so. It's in furtherance of the underlying conspiracy.

MR. PITTELL: I am just concerned that -- I mean, the theory of this case, the government's theory of the case is that he joined the conspiracy during the robbery, during the kidnapping and participated in various discussions or letters afterwards; not that it occurred and then he later joined in the coverup phase of the conspiracy. I'm just concerned that -- I don't --

THE COURT: How about --

MR. PITTELL: I'm sorry, go ahead.

THE COURT: How about we see whether or not the government — this may actually clarify this for the jury as well as resolve your problem.

What if -- and I'm looking at the government now -- what if we said, ladies and gentlemen, here is the piece on progress, here is the piece on joining, but please understand that the government's theory is that the defendant joined while the robbery and the kidnapping were in progress. So their theory that he joined during the period over the Labor Day weekend. I think that fairly characterizes what the government is suggesting, and I think that then resolves your issue which if they are only thinking of him joining later, they would be disabused of that.

1 MS. GERACI: That's fine, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Mr. Pittell, does that address your 3 concern? 4 MR. PITTELL: Yes. 5 THE COURT: The government's theory is that the 6 defendant joined the conspiracy over the Labor Day weekend 7 while the robbery and kidnapping were in progress. OK? MS. GERACI: Yes, your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: I see you're nodding your head, 10 Mr. Pittell. I take that as a yes. 11 MR. PITTELL: I'm sorry, I --12 THE COURT: No, I was writing down the wording, and I 13 just wanted to re-read it so we were clear. 14 All right. So that is the way we will do it. So can 15 the government tee up Government Exhibit 800? MS. GERACI: Your Honor, just to be clear, we are just 16 17 going to be playing the portions that we played in court. THE COURT: Only the portions you played in Court. 18 Ιt says: Can we have a playback for transcript of Government 19 20 Exhibit 800 of prison call between Dominique Jean-Philippe and 21 David Delva. 22 MS. GERACI: Yes, your Honor. We have that, and we 23 have the transcript ready as it plays. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Pittell, is there any question as to

what that is exactly? Do you want to see exactly what they are

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1 going to play?

MR. PITTELL: They're going to play what was admitted. There's not like there was a portion admitted that wasn't played.

THE COURT: No, but there are two ways that was played: One way during direct in which case it was a little bit longer and only a smaller clip was played during the summation, as I recall. My assumption is that the government is going to play the longer of the two.

MS. GERACI: Judge, we actually played exactly the same thing during summation and during the course of the trial.

THE COURT: It just took longer in my mind the first time.

MR. POSCABLO: But, Judge, it's in the English language, so the transcript isn't in evidence.

THE COURT: It's OK. It's an aid for them to follow along. I will give them that instruction. I always do that.

We are not going to send it back to them. We're going to play it out here. Is there any objection to that?

MR. PITTELL: No.

THE COURT: Let's see if we can get the jury out here and we'll see if we can do those two things with them.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: The Court has received a note from the jury signed by Deirdre Moy today's date at 3:15, and it was

handed to me at 3:22. The note has been marked as Court Exhibit 2. It has been read to counsel and it has two questions.

First, can we have a playback or transcript of number 800 prison call between Dominique Jean-Philippe and David Delva. So I take that counsel agrees that's the Government Exhibit 800, which is the recorded call, and we're going to play that for you in just a moment.

The second question is, is what "progress" in quotes means as used on page 39, Count One, second element; i.e., if a person learns of unlawful activity and a conspiracy surrounding it after the unlawful act, are they a co-conspirator?

In that regard, let me give you an addition will reference to the instruction. You have referred to page 39 Count One, second element. In particular, I want to answer the question by making sure that you look both at that instruction as well as the prior page, which is the participation in the conspiracy.

And as you can see from the instruction which you should review in its entirety, it states, in part: The defendant need not have joined the conspiracy at the outset; but, he must have, at some point during its progress, joined the conspiracy with knowledge as to its general scope and purpose. If he did join with such knowledge at any time while it was in progress, he may still be held responsible for all

that was done before he joined and all that was done during the conspiracy's existence while he was a member. Indeed, each member of a conspiracy may perform separate and distinct acts and may perform them at different times.

Now I'm going to go over the joining of the conspiracy, but I also just want to remind you that the government's theory is that the defendant joined the conspiracy over the Labor Day weekend, the conspiracy for kidnapping, the robbery conspiracy, while the robbery and kidnapping conspiracies — while the robbery and kidnapping were going on. So their theory is that he joined it over that weekend.

In terms of participation -- and I should note because I don't want my words just now to have been confusing. You know from all of the counts now which ones are conspiracy counts and which ones are not, right? There is also a narcotics distribution conspiracy. Anyway, you'll go back and look at all of those instructions as you deem appropriate.

But in terms of participation, I want to remind you that if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that if the conspiracy in Count One of the indictment existed, you must then determine whether the defendant intentionally and knowingly became a member that of conspiracy. You must determine not only whether defendant participated in the conspiracy but also whether he did so intentionally and knowingly; that is, did he participate in the conspiracy with

knowledge of its unlawful purpose and with a specific intention further objective of furthering the objective of that conspiracy.

Knowledge is a matter of inference from facts proved.

A person acts intentionally and knowingly if he acts

purposefully and deliberately and not because of mistake or

accident, mere negligent, or other innocent reason. That is,

the acts must be the product of the defendant's conscious

objective.

If you find that the conspiracy existed, and the defendant participated knowingly and intentionally in it, the extent of a defendant's participation has no bearing on whether or not he is guilty. The fact that a defendant's participation in a conspiracy is more limited of that as a co-conspirator, should not affect your verdict.

Now we are going to play Government Exhibit 800.

(Audio played back)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes our answer to the questions. You can go on back into the jury room. Thank you.

(Jury retires to deliberate at 3:54 p.m.)

(Jury not present)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, is there anything else we need to cover right now?

MR. POSCABLO: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Pittell?

MR. PITTELL: No.

THE COURT: So I will put the second juror note here for inspection. I will see you folks either at a few minutes before 5:00 or another note, whichever comes first.

MR. POSCABLO: Thank you, your Honor.

(Recess pending verdict)

(Jury present)

THE COURT: We are going to bring out the jury. I just want to mention to you folks that I had agreed to speak to a large group of people tomorrow in Washington D.C. I have told them I cannot go to Washington D.C. It is the heads of SEC enforcement from all over the country, and they are having a conference just with those internal folks, with their own folks. So I told them that I can do it by video conference, and I can be present for one hour as opposed to the two that they had originally scheduled me for.

I have made arrangements — we have been doing a backup plan for the last couple of days. We can't, it turns out, do it here in the court because the equipment is not compatible. I have to go to the SEC office on Vesey Street. My intention is to go there. I will leave here at 9:30. I will be there at quarter of 10:00. I will speak from 10:00 to 11:00 and be back by 11:15.

If the jury has a question during my absence, we're

going to have to have them wait. So they can start deliberating at 9:30, but if there is a question, I won't be able to get back to it until 11:00.

For you folks, would you prefer that I mention this to the jury or remain silent as to this? It is unclear whether they have a question or not. I would probably go ahead and tell them just so that they understand if there is an issue. On the other hand, I understand if you folks don't want me to do that because it may suggest they shouldn't deliberate as —I don't know, if you had a view about that. I don't know if you would have a view about that.

Mr. Pittell? Mr. Poscablo?

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, the government defers to your good judgment.

THE COURT: I am sort of indifferent.

MR. POSCABLO: So are we.

THE COURT: But Mr. Pittell?

MR. PITTELL: My view is I think you should probably tell them because otherwise let's say they come here at 9:30 and they got a note and they're waiting around two, three hours, it may be frustrating for them, which, actually, though, if you tell them that, on the flip side, then they might think well why don't we just get here at 11:00.

THE COURT: The alternative is we could have them come in and start at 10:30 and pick up at 10:30. That way I'm

almost back by then. I will be back by 11:15. That way they are not feeling like they start and don't have me available. Would that be preferable for folks?

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, you could also just ask them and give them the option. Let them know --

THE COURT: It's always difficult with 12 people on the fly at 5:00 p.m.

MR. POSCABLO: We defer.

THE COURT: Why don't we do this: Why don't we start them at 10:30 tomorrow morning, one hour later. I will tell them that the Court has to do something. I want to make sure I am available as quickly as I can be and, therefore, the start would be 10:30. Does that sound reasonable? Is that preferable for your folks?

MR. PITTELL: Of course the important question is when do we have to be here?

THE COURT: I would say 10:30 as well if it turns out that's when we're going to have the jury. You just need to be here when the jury is in, and, you know, for all of us, including for the defendant, we only have to be here when the jury is here. Let's do that. Let's bring the jury out.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, let's all be seated as you reach your seats. We are going to adjourn for the evening and have you folks come back tomorrow morning.

However, there is one thing that I need to do first thing in the morning, so I am going to have you folks start at 10:30 versus 9:30. All right? That way, if you have a question or anything comes up, I can attend to it very quickly. I don't want to have you waiting around at 9:30 if I am not available. I think that that makes the most sense.

So we will have you folks start at 10:30. And we will have lunch again, and Joe will have a menu left for you through the marshals on the table. I want to remind you not to talk to anybody other than each other when you are altogether at the same time about this case. So still do not talk to anybody else in your life about this case. See you folks tomorrow. Good night.

(Jury recessed)

THE COURT: So we will all gather again or you folks will gather again at 10:30 tomorrow morning. I will be available as close to that as I can be. It will be about 11:15, I will be in place, I would think, in my robing room or downstairs — upstairs. And anything else you folks want to raise tonight.

MR. POSCABLO: Not from the government, your Honor. Good evening.

MR. PITTELL: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. We're adjourned.

(Trial deliberations to continue Thursday, September 18, 2014 at 10:30 a.m.)